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Political Attitudes, Cognitive Style, and Political Persuasion
Halbert Bai1,3; Gregory Mitchell, JD, PhD2, Philip Tetlock, PhD1
Methods of Study 2
• This study was carried out over a nationally representative 
college-educated Qualtrics panel of eighty-one participants (50% 
women, ages 24-75, median age 54). 
• The study employed a 2x2x2 between-subjects factorial design. 
Independent variables were participant ideology, whether the 
argument was for or against policies of racial preference, and the 
argument’s integrative complexity (IC).
• Participants were randomly assigned to listen to one of four audio 
recordings of legal rulings on a fictitious race-based affirmative 
action (AA) case between a coalition of Asian Americans and 
UCLA. Participants were asked to summarize each argument by 
a 20:1 compression ratio.
Methods of Study 1
• Seventy-four participants (67.3% men, ages 18-75, median age 
21, 50.9% had at least a four-year degree) were recruited. Only 
the responses of those participants who correctly answered at 
least four of six true or false attention check reading questions 
were retained for analysis (N = 55).
• Eighteen articles were gathered on the issues of gun control, 
Confederate statues, and U.S. national anthem protests by N.F.L. 
players. Six articles were found for each topic, three liberal and 
three conservative in political orientation.
• Participants were asked their political orientation and randomly 
assigned by a Latin Square Design to read four articles. For each 
article, they were asked to identify its political orientation along 
an eight-point scale from extremely liberal to extremely 
conservative. Participants then responded to an Article Analysis 
Questionnaire that asked about the piece’s reliance on emotion, 
logic, its persuasiveness, and whether it was well-written.
Key Findings of Study 1
• The emotional valence of the arguments did not significantly 
explain the persuasiveness of the texts but being well-written and 
logical did. For liberals, whether a piece was logical and well 
written explained 32.6% of the variance (R = .326, F(2, 45) = 
10.891, p < .001). For conservatives, these two predictors 
explained 11.9% of the variance (R = .345, F(2, 77) = 5.198, p < 
.01). Instead, for conservatives, recognizing the argument’s 
political stance alone accounted for 13.1% of the variance in its 
persuasiveness (R = .363, F(1, 81) = 12.255, p < .01) and 
significantly predicted its persuasiveness (β = .363, p < .01).
Conclusion
• Liberals appear to view integrative complexity as mere window 
dressing and are less liable to shift their attitude in response. In 
contrast, conservatives are highly influenced by manipulations of 
integrative complexity. Listening to arguments of greater 
integrative complexity seemed to make conservatives more 
open-minded.
• Our studies suggest two diverging routes of persuasion. 
Conservatives appear to recognize and reward integrative 
complexity while liberals see past structural complexity and focus 
more on logic and how well-written an argument is overall.
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• How do liberals and conservatives differ? Existing evidence 
suggests clear divergences on cognitive style and sociopolitical 
attitudes. However, theories such as the rigidity of the right 
hypothesis (Adorno et al., 1950; Tetlock, 1983) and the ideologue 
hypothesis (Rokeach, 1956) make incompatible predictions.
• The present research aims to reconcile these incongruities by 
employing measures that assess (a) cognitive style/open-
mindedness, (b) perspective-taking, and (c) relationships 
between characteristics of procedural justice.
Key Findings of Study 2
• Actively open-minded thinking (AOT). On average, we found 
participants who identified as conservative had higher AOT 
scores (M = 2.63, SE =.13) than those who identified as liberal (M
= 2.25, SE = .12). This difference was significant t(79) = -2.19, p
< .05. On average, moderate liberals and conservatives had 
similar AOT scores t(51) = .779, p = .44 while staunch 
conservatives and staunch liberals differed greatly in AOT scores 
t(26) = 2.933, p < .01.
• We employed three metrics to assess perspective-taking: an 
assessment of participants’ attitudinal changes and two scores 
based on gists, namely their integrative complexity and content.
• Attitudinal Shifts. We found staunch conservatives on average 
changed their position on AA more so than liberals. This 
difference was significant t(26) = 2.976, p < .01. This difference 
was not significant comparing moderate liberals and moderate 
conservatives t(51) = -.875, p = .386.
• Gist Scores. We found no significant difference between liberals 
and conservatives on perspective-taking of the other side t(79) = 
-.561, p = .576. There was also no significant difference when we 
compared staunch conservatives and staunch liberals t(26) = 
.862, p = .397. The same held when comparing moderate 
conservatives and moderate liberals t(51) = .441, p = .661.
















• Participants were asked to 
complete the Actively 
Open-minded Thinking 
Scale, Cognitive Reflection 
Task, a Judge Open-
mindedness Questionnaire, 
and a Procedural Justice 
Questionnaire.
• The judicial opinions were 
constructed to be 
orthogonal in political 
orientation and integrative 
complexity.
Hypotheses
1. The Rigidity of the Right Perspective Predicts: Compared to 
political liberals, conservatives are less open-minded, worse 
perspective-takers, more receptive to arguments coming from 
their own side and less receptive to those of the other side, more 
averse to complexity, and exhibit poorer cognitive reflection.
2. The Ideologue Perspective Predicts: Compared to political 
moderates, staunch liberals and staunch conservatives are 
worse perspective-takers, more receptive to arguments that 
conform with their political worldview, are less open-minded, 
more averse to complexity, and demonstrate poorer cognitive 
reflection.
• Integrative Complexity of Gists. A Mann-Whitney test indicated 
that the integrative complexity of the summaries was greater for 
liberals (N = 38; M = 3.54; Mdn = 3) than for conservatives (N = 
43; M = 2.47; Mdn = 2), U = 492.0, p < .001, r = -.33. To test the 
ideologue hypothesis, we conducted further tests. We found that 
staunch conservatives (N = 12; M = 2.25; Mdn = 2.5) and 
staunch liberals (N = 16; M = 3.47; Mdn = 3.0) differed in the 
integrative complexity of their gists though non-significantly U = 
56.0, p = .09, r = -.33. The difference between moderate 
conservatives (N = 31; M = 2.55; Mdn = 2.0) and moderate 
liberals (N = 22; M = 3.59; Mdn = 3.0) was significant U = 213.0, 
p = .018, r = -.32. Both moderate liberals and staunch 
conservatives increased the integrative complexity of their gists 
upon hearing a highly complex conservative judge. No 
comparable shits were seen in the gists of liberal arguments.
• Cognitive Reflection Task (CRT). On average, participants who 
identified as conservative had lower CRT scores (M = 1.12, SE = 
.16) than those who identified as liberal (M = 1.13, SE = .18). 
This difference was not significant t(79) = 1.36, p = .18.
• Procedural justice. Trust in Federal courts significantly predicted 
ratings that the decision by the court was reasoned, b = .64, t(79) 
= 7.26, p < .001. Trust in Federal courts also explained a 
significant proportion of the variance in these ratings, R2 = .40, 
F(1, 79) = 52.76, p < .001.
Characteristics Liberals (N = 33) Conservatives (N = 22) All Participants (N = 55)
β R2 β R2 β R2
Well-written .508*** .258*** .328* .108* .387*** .150***
Emotion .173 .030 .182 .033 .090 .008
Logic -.457** .209** -.301* .091* -.353*** .124***
Argument’s Political 
Orientation -.164 .027 .363** .131** .206* .042*
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